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Toal: The South Carolina Law of Torts

BOOK REVIEW1
THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS. By F. Patrick Hubbard and Robert
L. Felix. Columbia: The South Carolina Bar-Continuing Legal Education
Division, Second Edition, 1997. Pp. xviii, 662. $130.00.
Reviewed by The HonorableJeanH. Toal2
I.

INTRODUCTION

In their second edition of The South CarolinaLaw ofTorts, 3 Hubbard
and Felix add to what was in their first edition a preeminent work of tort
scholarship. Their first edition, which was published in 1990, introduced the
bench and bar of this state to what has since become the most significant
authority on tort law in South Carolina. The second edition represents an
updated continuation of this invaluable resource.
In considering a modem treatise on torts, one must first pay homage
to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and his truly "original"4 work, The Common
Law.5 In The Common Law, Holmes sought to construct rationally the
theoretical infrastructure of the common law "through the association of
'empirical' historical inquiry with 'scientific' classification.",6 However,
Holmes's belief that legal doctrines should be molded by the fire of
contemporary efficacy modified his empiricism. 7 Holmes's approach was
especially profound in his treatment of torts. The result was the precursor to
modem tort law in this country.
Clearly, Hubbard and Felix's mission in their treatise on South
Carolina tort law is profoundly different from that ofHolmes's in The Common
Law. Nevertheless, their work reflects the continuing impact of Holmes's
ground-breaking scholarship. Like the botanist Linneaus, Holmes created the
framework within which future legal scholars would operate. The challenge for
contemporary authors like Hubbard and Felix is to assess and effectively
present the law as it has developed over the years. This is a daunting task for
any treatise writer.

1. The author's profound gratitude is extended to her law clerk Robert A.
Muckenfuss, a 1997 graduate of the University of South Carolina School of Law, who assisted
greatly in the preparation of this Article.
2. Associate Justice, South Carolina Supreme Court.
3. F.PATRICKHUBBARD&ROBERTL.FELIX, THESOLYrH CAROLINALAWOFTORTS (2d
ed. 1997).

4. See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER
SELF 3 (1993) (stating that The Common Law was "arguably the most original work of legal
scholarship by an American.").
5. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).

6. WHITE, supra note 4, at 113.
7. See id.
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By definition, a "treatise" is a work "that provides in a systematic
manner and for an expository or argumentive purpose a methodical discussion
of the facts and principles involved and conclusions reached."8 This definition
suggests only the minimal components required of a treatise. However, much
more is needed for a treatise to enjoy the accolade of being ideal.9 I propose
seven factors one should consider when assessing the effectiveness of a treatise.
The ideal treatise must first and foremost be comprehensive of the
subject-matter covered. Second, it must be thoughtfully organized and
presented to provide the reader with an easy reference to specific topics. Third,
it should be fully informative and concise without oversimplifying the law.
Fourth, it should provide a critical analysis of inconsistent or anomalous
authority. Fifth, it must be insightful as to the possible future flow of the law.
Sixth, it needs to be reflective of relevant social policy and its impact on the
law. Finally, the ideal treatise must be up-to-date with the pertinent authority.
Such a list presents an almost paralyzing task for authors, especially
in the area of tort law. However, Hubbard and Felix provide in the second
edition of their book a superior example of how each of these components can
effectively be incorporated into a single volume treatise. I will discuss each
factor below.
II.

ANALYSIS OF HUBBARD AND FELIX'S TREATISE

First, Hubbard and Felix provide a truly comprehensive survey of
South Carolina tort law. On a macro level, their treatise covers all of the major
branches of tort law, ranging from simple negligence to wrongful death actions.
On a micro level, their treatise systematically addresses the major issues arising
under each subject. In covering such a wide range of topics, authors are faced
with the danger that their treatise will be superficial in its coverage and have
a lack of cohesiveness in its structure. Hubbard and Felix skillfully avoid such
pitfalls. Structurally the book is composed of ten chapters. The first chapter
takes a broad perspective and gives the reader a sense of the major themes
underlying the subject matter. The treatise then methodically addresses each
major area of tort law. Each chapter is thoughtfully outlined and is broken
down into discrete sections allowing the reader to hone in quickly on a
particular topic. The reader immediately knows the terrain of a chapter and can
therefore proceed more intelligently.
The book's superb organization is complemented by its depth of
discussion. Hubbard and Felix do not simply recite the law; they identify
patterns and synthesize the law to provide an insightful andpractical guide. The
book is heavy with references to a wide array of authorities addressing the
various legal principles under discussion. Additionally, Hubbard and Felix are
8.WEBSTERS THIRD NEW

INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 2435 (1965).

9. See Frederick Davis, Book Review, 46 MD. L. REV. 886 (1987) (reviewing FOWLER
V. HARPER ET. AL., THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1986)).
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quick to highlight inconsistent or anomalous areas of the law. This allows the
reader to engage (more actively) the particular topic being presented.
Moreover, the treatise is generous with cross-references to other sources which
permit the reader to probe more fully an inconsistency and its effect on the law.
Although the ideal treatise must be comprehensive and fully
informative, it must resist the temptation to overload the reader with excess
discussion. Authors of such treatises must find a way to convey concisely
critical information while alerting the reader to more in-depth discussions
related to a topic. Hubbard and Felix are ever mindful of this mission and
skillfully balance the requirement for specificity against the danger of losing
the reader in too much detail. Their effort in this regard is exemplified by their
coverage of comparative negligence."
Prior to the publication of their second edition, Hubbard and Felix
produced a law review article on comparative negligence and the
implementation of Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co." in South Carolina." This
article explores the impact of comparative fault in almost every conceivable
area of tort law. In areas where South Carolina courts have not yet ruled, the
article sifts through the law in other jurisdictions to determine the most likely
development in this state. The article also includes tables showing the status of
comparative negligence and various common law defenses in other
jurisdictions. 3 Clearly, such detail would be inappropriate for a treatise
comprehending all of torts. However, as a reference tool, it provides Hubbard
and Felix with a unique and unparalleled resource with which to support their
book. The article also illustrates the intense dedication that they have
consistently brought to first-quality tort scholarship in South Carolina.
Their coverage of comparative negligence is also emblematic of their
insight into the future development of the law in this state. For example,
observing that no South Carolina court has yet to address the impact of
comparative negligence on express assumption of risk, Hubbard and Felix go
further to state that express assumption of risk generally remains an absolute
bar to recovery even under comparative fault.' 4 In support of this statement,

they provide a detailed discussion of express assumption of risk" and make
reference to their law review article on comparative fault. 6 The net result is an

10. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 3, at 174-90.
11. 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991) (stating that the South Carolina Supreme
Court adopts the doctrine of comparative negligence).
12. See F. Patrick Hubbard & Robert L. Felix, Comparative Negligence in South
Carolina: Implementing Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 43 S.C. L. Rnv. 273 (1992).
13. Id. at 329-43.
14. HUBBARD & FELIX, supranote 3, at 188. Recently, in Davenportv. Cotton Hope
PlantationHorizontalPropertyRegime, No. 24850, Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 35 at 8, 14 (S.C.
Nov. 9, 1998), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that express assumption of risk would
remain an absolute bar to recovery under comparative fault.
15. Id. at 189-90.
16. Id. at 188.
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analysis that provides the reader with a solid foundation on which to predict
how a South Carolina court might rule on this issue.
Next, an effective treatise on torts must, where appropriate, reflect
upon the relevant policies that frequently drive trends in tort law. Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. recognized the centrality of social policy in tort law when
he wrote,
The philosophical habit of the day, the frequency of
legislation, and the case with which the law may be changed
to meet the opinions and wishes of the public, all make it
natural and unavoidable that judges as well as others should
openly discuss the legislative principles upon which their
decisions must always rest in the end, and should base their
judgments upon broad considerations of policy .... 7
Hubbard and Felix address this influence in a section devoted
completely to policies of tort law.' 8 Moreover, they coverpolicy throughout the
book as it relates to specific topics. For example, in discussing claims for
emotional distress, their treatise balances the strict proof requirements for
establishing duty of care against the modem trend generally supporting liability
for injuries caused by negligence. 9 In doing so, the treatise canvasses a wide
spectrum of authority to distill three general rules for determining liability for
mental distress not resulting from physical injury.20 This type of legal synthesis
gives the reader a sense of direction and equilibrium. The reader is better able
to understand the universe in which a court might decide a particular issue.
Finally, a very basic and vital component of a tort treatise is that its
coverage be as current as possible. In tort law, the landscape frequently
changes as courts struggle to keep up with social and legislative developments.
In such a volatile environment, a premium for a single, comprehensive
authority that presents the law in a coherent and pragmatic fashion exists.
Hubbard and Felix's treatise exemplifies such a resource. With the same
masterful discernment that marked their first edition, Hubbard and Felix
produce, in their second edition, a truly comprehensive and up-to-date work
that will be made current in the future by an annual, cumulative supplement.
Any judge or attorney confronting tort law issues in South Carolina should
have this treatise close at hand as a reference. Below is a sampling of some of
the more recent developments in South Carolina tort law covered in their
second edition.
Certainly one of the biggest, though not most recent, developments in
South Carolina tort law came in 1991 when the South Carolina Supreme Court

17.

HOLMES,

supra note 5, at 78.

18. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 3, at 4-26.
19. Id. at41-42.
20. Id. at 42-44.
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adopted comparative negligence. In Nelson v. ConcreteSupply Co.2' the court
held that for all causes of action arising on or after July 1, 1991, a plaintiff in
a negligence action may recover damages if his negligence is not greater than
that of the defendant.22 Nelson made clear that a plaintiffs contributory
negligence would no longer bar recovery unless such negligence exceeded that
of the defendant. However, not so clear was what effect Nelson would have on
other common law defenses.
InDavenportv.CottonHope PlantationHorizontalPropertyRegime3
the South Carolina Court of Appeals addressed the impact of Nelson on the
defense of assumption of risk. Under the traditional common law doctrine of
assumption of risk, if a plaintiff assumed the risk of injury, then he was
completely barred from recovery.24 In Davenport,the court held that implied
assumption of risk had been subsumed by comparative negligence.?' In other
words, implied assumption of risk was simply another factor to consider in
comparing the parties' negligence, rather than an absolute bar to recovery.
Hubbard and Felix provide the reader with a thorough discussion in this area
by going beyond the holding of Davenport and explaining the difference
between implied and express assumption of risk. 26
In the area of governmental and official immunity, several
developments relating to monetary limits on liability occured. In Southeastern
FreightLines v. City ofHartsville27 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
the legislature's enactment of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act28 impliedly repealed sections 15-78-100(c) and 15-78-120(a)(1) of the
South Carolina Tort Claims Act. 29 Section 15-78-100(c) requires the trier of
fact in any tort action against a government entity to "return a special verdict

21. 303 S.C. 243,399 S.E.2d 783 (1991).

22. Id. at 245, 399 S.E.2d at 784.
23. 325 S.C. 507,482 S.E.2d 569 (Ct. App. 1997), aff'd, Davenport v. Cotton Hope
PlantationHorizontalProperty Regime, No. 24850, Shearouse Adv. Sh.No. 35 at 8, 14 (S.C.

Nov. 9, 1998).
24. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 3, at 186.
25. Davenport,325 S.C. at 512, 482 S.E.2d at 574.
26. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 3, at 187-90. In Davenport v. Hope Plantation

HorizontalPropertyRegime, No. 24850, Shearouse Adv. Sh.No. 35 at 8,14 (S.C. Nov. 9,1998),
the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals's opinion with some important
modifications. Notably, the court specifically distinguished implied and expressed assumption
of risk. The court held that primary implied assumption of risk and expressed assumption ofrisk
would remain unaffectedby comparative negligence while secondary implied assumption ofrisk,
as a complete defense, was effectively abrogated by the adoption of comparative negligence. The
court concluded that a plaintiff would not be barred from recovery by secondary implied
assumption of risk unless the degree of fault arising therefrom is greater than the negligence of
the defendant. The court ruled that it would apply its decision to the case subjudice and to all
causes of action that arise or accrue after the date of its opinion. Hubbard and Felix will
undoubtedly discuss the court's holding in their next supplement,
27. 313 S.C. 466,443 S.E.2d 395 (1994).
28. S.C. CODEANN. § 15-38-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
29. SoutheasternFreightLines, 313 S.C. at 469, 443 S.E.2d at 397.
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specifying the proportion of monetary liability of each defendant against whom
liability is determined."3 Section 15-78-120(a)(1) limits the total monetary
liability of all government entities to $250,000 per claimant for any one
occurrence. 3 The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, enacted after
the Tort Claims Act, allows unlimited, pro rata liability for tortfeasors.32 The
court held that the statutes were inconsistent with each other, and therefore, the
later statute repealed the earlier one.33
In response to Southeastern, the legislature reenacted section 15-78120(a)(1) and made it retroactive to April 5, 1988, except for causes of action
filed before July 1, 1994. 34 In construing this reenactment language, the court
inMcClainv. South CarolinaDepartmentofEducation35 held that the General
Assembly clearly regarded the Uniform Contribution Act, prior to its 1994
amendment, as repealing section 15-78-120(a)(1) under all circumstances.36 In
other words, the $250,000 cap is inapplicable to all cases filed before July 1,
1994. The court later extended the holdings of SoutheasternandMcClainto the
$500,000 per
occurrence cap found in section 15-78-120(a)(2) 37 of the Tort
38
Claims Act.
Hubbard and Felix also address the recent developments under the
South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act ("UTPA"), S.C. Code Ann. §39-520 (1985). 39 In Daisy OutdoorAdvertising Co. v. Abbott" the South Carolina
Supreme Court clarified the proof required to satisfy the public interest element
of private causes of action under UTPA. The court found that plaintiffs fulfill
the UTPA's public interest requirement by alleging and proving that unfair or
deceptive conduct has the potential for repetition; no additional proof of public
impact is necessary beyond proof of the potential for repetition of the kind of
actions at issue.4' Prior to the supreme court's decision in Daisy, the court of
appeals was narrowing the scope of the private cause of action by requiring

ever greater degrees of proof to satisfy the UTPA's public interest prong.42
Daisy should resolve longstanding confusion about the interaction between the
potential for repetition of an unfair or deceptive act and the public interest
requirement itself.
Daisy concerned a dispute between two outdoor advertisers. Both

S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-100(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
Id. § 15-78-120(a)(1).
See id. § 15-38-20(B).
SoutheasternFreightLines, 313 S.C. at 469, 443 S.E.2d at 397.
See 1994 S.C. Acts 497.
323 S.C. 132,473 S.E.2d 799 (1996).
Id. at 136, 473 S.E.2d at 801.
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
38. Knoke v. South Carolina Dep't of Parks, Recreation, & Tourism, 324 S.C. 136,
141, 478 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1996).
39. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 3, at 374.
40. 322 S.C. 489,473 S.E.2d 47 (1996).
41. Id. at 496, 473 S.E.2d at 51.
42. See id. at 493-95, 473 S.E.2d at 49-50.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
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Daisy Outdoor Advertising and Abbott Company Outdoor Advertising leased
billboard space to advertisers. 4" When Abbott leased a billboard located on
Interstate 85 to an advertiser, Daisy erected a large "for sale" sign in front of
Abbott's billboard, obstructing drivers' views of the advertisement.' This sign
forced Abbott to find an alternate location for the advertiser. Abbott leased
another billboard to Hamrick's of Gaffney.4 5 Daisy once again erected a large
"for sale" sign in front of Abbott's billboard, and Hamrick's quit paying rent
for use of the billboard.' Daisy sued Abbott for interference with Daisy's
contractual relations with a third party, and Abbott counterclaimed alleging
unfair competition under the UTPA based on Daisy's blocking Abbott's
billboards. 7 After a non-jury trial, the circuit court ruled Daisy had violated the
UTPA.48

The court of appeals reversed the circuit court, holding no evidence
supported the assertion Daisy's actions had an adverse effect on the public
interest.4 9 According to the court, a party could not show that an action
adversely affected the public interest merely by showing the action had the
potential for repetition." The opinion ofthe court of appeals also suggested that
a UTPA plaintiff must prove at least two separate torts-one against the
plaintiff and one against some third party-in order to show any adverse effect
on the public interest.-"
The supreme court strongly disagreed with the analysis of the court of
appeals. First, the court surveyed past precedents and concluded that, "Prior
case law makes very clear that evidence of a potential for repetition, generally
speaking, in and of itself establishes the required public impact." 52 The court
also noted that proof of a tort against a third party was not an element of a
cause of action under the UTPA 3 The supreme court then described what
kinds of evidence will indicate that an act has the potential for repetition, thus
satisfying the UTPA's public interest requirement. Usually, plaintiffs will show
potential for repetition in one of two ways: (1) by showing "the same kind of
actions occurred in the past, thus making it likely they will continue to occur
absent deterrence," and (2) by showing that "the company's procedures create

43. Id. at 491,473 S.E.2d at 48.
44. Id. at 492, 473 S.E.2d at 48.
45. Id. at 492, 473 S.E.2d at 49.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Daisy Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Abbott, 317 S.C. 14,18-19,451 S.E.2d 394,397 (Ct.
App. 1994).
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Daisy Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Abbott, 322 S.C. 489,496,473 S.E.2d 47,51 (1996).

53. Id.
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a potential for repetition ofthe unfair and deceptive acts."54 The court declined
to hold that these two ways were "the only means for showing potential for
repetition/public impact."5 5 Instead, South Carolina courts should evaluate
cases on their own merits." Furthermore, proof of potential for repetition is not
always necessary to satisfy the UTPA's public interest requirement, because
some single acts may, in and of themselves, adversely affect the public
interest.5 7 In fact, in York v. Conway Ford,Inc., 8 the South Carolina Supreme
Court found the potential for repetition based solely on the fact that Conway
Ford was in the business of selling cars.5 '
As noted above, these cases represent only a small sampling of the
developments that have occurred in South Carolina tort law in recent years. The
variety and complexity of such cases demonstrate the monumental effort
required to organize and to present concisely South Carolina tort law in one
book. Hubbard and Felix have achieved this with amazing precision and
without compromising the substance of the law itself.
III.

CONCLUSION

As recognized by another reviewer of a well-known treatise on torts,
"the writing of a full-length treatise on torts is a considerably more complex
task today than it was a generation ago." 6' Today, treatise writers must not only
grapple with the ideological foundations of tort law, but also with the many
layers added by courts and legislatures since Holmes's exposition many years
ago. Such a task is fraught with peril and requires panoramic vision. Hubbard
and Felix have engaged this challenge with incredible ease and wisdom. The
end result is a treatise that stands alone in its superb coverage of South Carolina
tort law.

54. Id.The court cited Barnes v. Jones Chevrolet Co., 292 S.C. 607, 358 S.E.2d 156
(Ct. App. 1987), to illustrate the first way to prove potential for repetition. In Barnes the court
of appeals found that past instances of bill padding, the same practice complained of in the
instant case, were relevant to establish a potential for repetition and, therefore, to satisfy the
public interest requirement. The court cited Haley Nursery Co. v. Forrest,298 S.C. 520, 381
S.E.2d 906 (1989), and Dowd v. ImperialChrysler-Plymouth,Inc., 298 S.C. 439,381 S.E.2d 212
(Ct. App. 1989), to show the second way to prove potential for repetition. In those cases,
evidence showed that the defendants' procedures were such that the kind of unfair or deceptive
act complained of was likely to recur.
55. Daisy OutdoorAdver. Co., 322 S.C. at 497,473 S.E.2d at 51.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 496, 473 S.E.2d at 51 ("Sometimes, the potential for repetition or other
adverse impact on the public interest will be apparent.") (emphasis added).
58. 325 S.C. 170,480 S.E.2d 726 (1997).
59. Id. at 173, 480 S.E.2d at 728.
60. Davis, supra note 9, at 889 (quoting Dix Noel, Book Review, 25 TENN. L. REV.
321, 324 (1957)).
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